parallax background

HISTORICAL SETTINGS

The path to authoritarianism:

Jorge Pacheco Areco in power. (1967-1971)

After the death of Oscar Gestido, Jorge Pacheco Areco, is named President of the Republic. His mandate will be characterized by a systematic application of measures that increasingly restricted individual freedoms, by growing authoritarianism and the advance of repression mainly towards the social sectors. In this sense, both the Prompt Security Measures as well as the provisions for the dissolution of left-wing parties or movements, the closures of newspapers or seminars in favor of these trends, the militarization of public and private officials, and the ignorance of functional autonomies, They will be - among other things - the most outstanding elements of his mandate. Pacheco's government had notoriously conservative and authoritarian aspects; in this sense, he legislated practically by decree under the Prompt Security Measures, with almost no participation from the Legislative Branch, which on the other hand seemed hesitant and weakened.

The “Época” agreement occurred in 1967. It meant the union of left-wing groups and parties, such as the Socialist Party, the Eastern Revolutionary Movement, the Anarchist Federation of Uruguay, the Independent Revolutionary Movement, the Uruguayan Popular Action Movement and independents. Those who promote the joint publication of the newspaper Época and establish a platform of common points (1). On December 12 of the same year, the government ordered the dissolution of the aforementioned leftist groups.

The year 1968 appears in historiography as a pivotal and key year for the period. With it, a stage in the economic, social and political development of Uruguay culminates and the beginning of another qualitatively different one, this new stage, was characterized by the predominance of centralized state apparatuses and by the generalization and polarization of society. “Since then, the Executive's speech focused on the ideological principle crisis-order, and from it all the government's activity was developed. It was also a time of loss of the negotiating function of Parliament.” (2)

The Executive and Legislative branches began a period of confrontation, the most common causes being the implementation or lifting of Prompt Security Measures, the closure of press media, the militarization of public officials or even the political trial that took place in 1971. did to the President. The dominant tone of the Pacheco government was constant. Beginning in June 1968 (and with the exception of the period from March 15 to June 24, 1969), the country lived permanently under Prompt Security Measures until the declaration of the Internal State of War on June 15. April 1972, which ceased on June 12 of that year after the entry into force of a new State Security Law. “What was understood in the Constitution as exceptional measures in serious and unforeseen cases of external attack or internal commotion, became the permanent mechanism of government”. (3)

The link between the Pacheco government and the Armed Forces (FF.AA.) began to strengthen deeply. After the escape of more than one hundred Tupamaro inmates from the Punta Carretas Prison (September 9, 1971), he was charged with directing the anti-subversive fight. Given this, “on September 15, the Armed Forces had made public a doctrinal document in which they established their mission to restore internal order and provide security for development. This declaration, whose content is evidently close to the National Security Doctrine, is the confirmation of how, from then on, the Armed Forces would interpret their role in Uruguayan society and politics”. (4) Later, in December of that year, the Board of Commanders in Chief was created on an experimental basis, and with it the preparatory steps for the military era were completed.(5)

From a social perspective, tensions are intensifying, generating an authoritarian advance of significant magnitude, witnessing a multiplicity of conflicts between the State apparatus and civil society. Police and later military repression was another of the constant applications of the Pacheco government to contain the situation. Rey Tristán points out, starting in August 1970(6), “the Prompt Security Measures were fundamentally motivated and defined for the repression of union activity and everything that opposed government policy and had the capacity for social mobilization, in speech and actions of the pachequista government, a new enemy was defined”(7). On the other hand, and from 1970 until the coup d'état, there would be no more than three months of institutional normality.

 

27 de junio de 1973: Huelga general de trabajadores y estudiantes. Imagen: Aurelio González.
June 27, 1973: General strike of workers and students. Image: Aurelio González.
Wilson Ferreira Aldunate en la cámara de Senadores en la noche del 27 de junio de 1973. Imagen: Aurelio González
Wilson Ferreira Aldunate in the Senate on the night of June 27, 1973. Image: Aurelio González
Militares recorriendo el Salón de los Pasos Perdidos en el Palacio Legislativo - 27 de junio de 1973.
Senior military officers touring the Hall of Lost Steps in the Legislative Palace - June 27, 1973.  Image: Aurelio González
Sepelio de Ramón Roberto Peré, el 8 de julio de 1973. Peré, estudiante de veterinaria, había sido asesinado un día antes por efectivos policiales vestidos de particular. Su sepelio fue acompañado por miles de personas a pesar de la represión y la vigilancia de aquellos días. Foto: Aurelio González.
Funeral of Ramón Roberto Peré, on July 8, 1973. Peré, a veterinary student, had been murdered the day before by police officers in private clothes. His funeral was accompanied by thousands of people despite the repression and surveillance of those days. Image: Aurelio González.Manifestación en la Av. 18 de julio contra el Golpe Militar. 9 de julio de 1973. Imagen: Aurelio González
Demonstration on July 18 Avenue against the Military Coup. July 9, 1973. Image: Aurelio González

 

 

Towards the coup d'état:

The presidency of Juan María Bordaberry (1972-1973)

The Colorado Party achieved victory again, and within the motto the Bordaberry-Sapelli formula was the most voted, obtaining 22.8% of the votes. In this way, the power of the Colorado Party in the country was consolidated once again, in addition to predicting continuity and deepening of the policies initiated in the previous government, thus ensuring the prolongation of the process begun in 1968 .(8)

On March 1, 1972, Bordaberry assumed the government in the midst of an environment of crisis and strong social and political conflict. According to Rey Tristán, “from the elections, and after the triumph of the conservative sectors, the irreversible deterioration of the national situation began that would culminate in the military coup of 1973”(9) Upon assuming the government, Bordaberry promoted an alliance with the conservative sectors of the National Party in exchange for positions in the cabinet to achieve greater support for their management. At the same time, links with the Armed Forces begin to become even closer, which leads to a much more active and predominant political participation of this sector.

In general terms, the new administration that was installed did nothing more than continue the guidelines adopted during the presidency of Jorge Pacheco Areco. At the political level, the country was immersed in a deep crisis aggravated by the growth of violence, in addition to the strong authoritarianism with which the governing party acted. On the other hand, there was an “accelerated process of decline in the norms of democratic coexistence,” which led to an even greater deterioration of the institutions.

On the other hand, the MLN-T resumed armed actions, after the period of inaction agreed upon during the electoral period. In this sense, the year began with the “Paysandú Declaration of War” on January 1, 1972 and later on April 14 of that year, one of the most shocking actions up to that moment was carried out, which turned the the situation of the country. Given this, the President declared the “State of Internal War” (which suspended individual guarantees) which was extended until July 10, 1972 with the approval of the “State Security Law.” This law largely reflected the aspirations that the military had, which is why it could be said that significant military pressure was gained in national decisions. At a general level, this law granted greater freedom to the Armed Forces. to control and dispose of the detainees, in addition, some crimes that until now were considered “common” were considered military; on the other hand, the established penalties became broader and more repressive

.At the same time, the Armed Forces They continued their military campaign against the MLN-T, whose main objective was the disappearance of the armed group.(10) The predominant way in which the so-called anti-subversive fight was developed, according to Hugo Cores, was the detention and torture of the enemy. Its objective was the organizational dismantling, isolation and demoralization of armed dissidence. The new repressive role of the Armed Forces. (especially the Army and a part of the Navy) was characterized by being an organic, collective movement, involving the entire institution and within the framework of its established, strongly cohesive hierarchical instances. Internal dissensions were absorbed or repressed the moment they arose.(11)

The complaints of the excesses of the Armed Forces. They began to be commonplace in the area of ​​the Legislative Branch, however, they did not manage to transform the practice they carried out nor did they obtain positive results when trying to stop the government's policy. On several occasions the Armed Forces They had been accused of human rights violations and of exercising a significant repressive overflow, this in any case did not influence the changes in national directives, on the contrary, attitudes of disobedience in the face of claims or decisions coming from the judicial sphere became common. or parliamentary. On the other hand, Parliament, faced with this and other events, began to feel increasingly concerned about its own survival as it perceived that the decisions it issued were not respected or taken into account. In any case, according to Nahum, the political class remained silent or accepted the progressive reduction of its powers.(12)

Meanwhile, the President of the Republic continued with his preaching based on the “order-subversion” dichotomy, also fueling “a risky confusion by including in the notion of subversion other political and social agents that had no relationship with armed actions.” (13)

Towards the end of 1972, the national situation of the country did nothing more than predict a future institutional breakdown. From this perspective, Caetano and Rilla point out that “the growing and already undisguised political prominence of the military, the precarious parliamentary stability of the government, a virtual situation of "tie" of hegemonies and reciprocal vetoes within the political system, the exacerbation of social conflict faced with the deepening of the repressive practices of the regime, among other factors, did nothing more than lend credibility to the circulating coup rumors, (…).”(14) The link between society and the State was completely deteriorated in the face of growing authoritarianism.

In February 1973, a serious institutional crisis placed democratic institutions in suspense. The military reacted negatively to the appointment of Gen. Antonio Francese to the position of Minister of National Defense (15). On February 8, the Army and Air Force issued a statement urging the President of the Republic to relieve said general of that position, given that both forces had decided not to respond to the orders of the new minister. On the other hand, the National Navy, loyal to Bordaberry, occupied the Old City, blocking it. This atmosphere only deepened the existing crisis in addition to generating tensions at the political, social and also military levels. The coup d'état seemed imminent

.At the same time, the military issued statements 4 and 7 -on February 9 and 10-, signed by the Commander of the Army, Gen. Hugo Chiappe Posse and by Brigadier José Pérez Caldas, Commander of the Air Force. There it was proposed, in addition to combating subversion, “the fight against forms of economic corruption, the elimination of external debt, the incentive for exports, the eradication of unemployment, etc.”(16) These communications generated great confusion in various political and social spheres. Many sectors expressed confused sympathies towards communiqués 4 and 7, which certainly did not help the creation of a pole of democratic forces. According to Caetano and Rilla, in several opposition parties and groups the slogan of “critical support” for the military began to circulate, weaving different versions about the scope of the so-called “febrerism.”

The crisis was dissolved on February 13, 1973, when the “Boisso Lanza Agreement” was signed. It stipulated the creation of the National Security Council (COSENA), made up of the President, some ministries, the Commanders of the three arms and the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would begin to come into effect – legalized by a decree ten days after its creation.

Nahum points out that almost all the authors who have studied the period prior to the 1973 coup d'état agree that it is the culmination of a long process that began some time ago. In this way, it is possible to detect two major moments identified as the turning points in this sense, firstly, the year 1968, as the beginning of the repressive scale, and, secondly, starting in September 1971 when the Armed Forces They assumed leadership of the anti-subversive fight. The first moment characterized by “the repression of the student and labor movement, the implementation of repressive legal mechanisms (...), the control and manipulation of the social media”(17), which signaled the gradual collapse of the democratic system . The second moment had the particularity of the increasing prominence of the Armed Forces in state decisions, along with a significant expansion and politicization of them. Added to this are the important fissures that began to appear between civil and military power.

It is interesting to bring up the synthesis made by Rey Tristán regarding the events that triggered the coup d'état, since it is understood that it accurately summarizes what happened: “the coup came on June 27, 1973, although since October 1972 and at The Armed Forces were practically autonomous, they did not respond to political power. The institutional crisis of February 1973, key to the process, had confirmed this. The Boiso Lanza pact of the 12th, which put an end to the crisis, entrusted the Armed Forces with the mission of providing security for national development, and created the National Security Council (COSENA), (...). This meant the definitive entry of the military into civil power, which in reality already meant its submission. The events of June would be nothing more than confirmation of the situation established since February.” (18)

On June 27, 1973, “(...) troops from Military Region No. 1 occupy the Legislative Palace. A new and painful phase began in the Uruguayan authoritarian process. That same day, hundreds of thousands of workers, organized in the CNT, declared a general strike for an indefinite period, as had been resolved in different workers' congresses starting in 1964. (...), the strike was, after two weeks , defeated.” This would be the beginning of 12 years of civil-military dictatorship.(19)

 

 


Text extracted from "THE REPRESSIVE ADVANCE. Historical context" Carla Larrobla, Magdalena Figueredo, Fabiana Larrobla and Graciana Sagaseta (March 2014, Montevideo)

(1)"Some of them are support for the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) [the “OLAS” promoted the insurrectional strategy at the continental level, in addition to having declared itself favorable to guerrilla action in Uruguay] considering the working class as the backbone of revolt and armed struggle as an inseparable part of militancy, and the need to combat reformism.” VESCOVI, Rodrigo. Revolutionary echoes. Social fighters, Uruguay 1968-1973, Montevideo, Ed. Nóos. 2003, Page 36.

(2)REY TRISTAN, Eduardo. Just around the corner. The Uruguayan revolutionary left. 1965- 1973, Montevideo, Ediciones Fin de Siglo, 2006. Page 32.

(3) Idem Page 33 - 34.

(4) Idem Page 40.

(5) Among the significant events we can mention such as, “the first days of September, Col. Néstor Bolentini, as Military Investigative Judge, decreed for the first time the prosecution of civilians, violating article 253 of the Constitution, which expressly establishes that military jurisdiction is limited to military crimes.” Without a doubt, the interference of the Armed Forces in national decisions was something notable. CORES, Hugo. Uruguay towards the dictatorship, 1968-1973: The offensive of the right, the popular resistance and the errors of the left. Montevideo, Banda Oriental, 1999. Page 98.

(6)“August ´70 has been a month of tension in the guerrilla confrontation. There have been several kidnappings and Dan Mitrione has been killed by the MLN. For the first time in the history of the country, on August 11, the Legislative Branch supports the initiative of the Executive Branch by suspending the validity of individual guarantees.” Idem. Page 61.

(7)REY TRISTÁN, Eduardo. Ob. Cit. Page 35.

(8) It is interesting to remember that the elections of November 1971 were carried out in a climate of restriction of freedoms; the social environment at that time was covered by strong tension generated fundamentally by the authoritarian turn of recent years. The MLN-T had declared an electoral truce where it suspended its actions for that period, however, the action of far-right groups against left-wing individuals and groups was constant, which further fostered the critical situation.

(9)REY TRISTÁN, Eduardo. Ob. Cit. Page 39.

(10) Idem Page 39.

(11) CORES, Hugo. Ob. Cit. Page 119.

(12) NAHUM, Benjamín, MARONNA, Mónica, FREGA, Ana y TROCHON, Ivette. El Fin del Uruguay Liberal, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1998. Page 87.

(13) Idem. Page 87

(14) CAETANO, Gerardo y RILLA, José. Breve historia de la dictadura Montevideo, Banda Oriental, 1987. Page 13

(15) Given the resignation of General Antonio Armando Malet.

(16) NAHUM, Benjamín y otros. Ob. Cit. Page 93.

(17) Idem. Page 93.

(18)REY TRISTÁN, Eduardo. Ob. Cit. Page 41.

(19) CORES, Hugo. Ob. Cit. Page 194.

Bibliography

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CORES, Hugo. Uruguay hacia la dictadura, 1968-1973: La ofensiva de la derecha, la resistencia popular y los errores de la izquierda. Montevideo, Banda Oriental, 1999.
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